Prof. Berner is handling the criminal law portion of the update. I don’t practice criminal law, but fortunately, Prof. Berner starts out talking about section 1983 litigation in which I most certainly do participate. The first case had to do with a high speed chase where a police officer ran his car into a suspect to get him to stop. The Supreme Court apparently held that this did not implicate the 4th Amendment. Use of deadly force on an unarmed suspect who presents no immediate threat of harm to others probably implicates the 4th amendment. Use of deadly force on an armed suspect wanted for murder in a populated area and the 4th amendment probably isn’t implicated. Besides, in the police chase case, bumping a car is a lesser type of “deadly” force than shooting someone. A balance is required between the need for taking custody of the person immediately and the dangers associated with the use of deadly force. (Not legal advice, but I’d probably suggest to a fleeing suspect in this situation that he or she might want to stop). The Supreme Court in the motor vehicle chase decided that there was no question that the use of force was reasonable. Interestingly, the Supreme Court dropped a footnote to the police video (welcome to the 21st century) by way of supporting their conclusion — even at the summary judgment phase — that the suspect’s version of events simply was not credible.
Next case is a California case where the police get a suspect’s address from the BMV or some such. They get a daytime warrant. They show up with a good deal of force at 7 a.m. Turns out the suspect has sold the house, unbeknownst to the police. Presumably hijinx ensues. Ah yes, 17 year old answers the door. Naked couple in the bed. Couple ordered out of bed. The three occupants bring a 1983 suit (1983 suits are vehicles by which people can bring suit against state and local government for violations of their federal rights.) The court finds that the occupants 4th Amendment rights were not violated. The police got a warrant. The police didn’t know that the suspect was not in the house. The police cut off the confrontation as soon as they figure out that they have the wrong people. Determining whether a violation has occurred has to be taken from the facts known to the police before they go in.
Next. Driver is stopped for no good reason. Passenger is recognized as a local no-goodnik. Computer shows that the passenger is wanted on a no-bond warrant. Search incident to arrest reveals a bunch of contraband. Passenger argues for suppression because the initial stop was flawed. State argues that the passenger wasn’t “seized” prior to probable cause — he was just along for the ride. The driver may have an argument, but passenger wasn’t seized until after probably cause had been established. Court reasons that the passenger wouldn’t reasonably think he or she was free to break off the interaction. The police are probably going to take umbrage at the passenger saying, “See ya later.” So, the court held that the passenger was seized at the time the car was stopped and that’s when the 4th Amendment started applying.
Next. Eighth Amendment. Traditionally, insane people can’t be executed. Federal statute says that habeas corpus petitions have to include all claims in the first petition. The idea being to speed things up. In this case, he brought all his claims except one. The second petition said that the inmate was now insane and can’t be executed. This one’s different. Other claims involve things that happened before judgment. The insanity matter involves the condemned man’s state of mind at the time of execution. (The rationale of “too crazy to kill” mostly escapes me. I have some issues with the death penalty — primarily my doubt of how well our trial processes guarantee that the condemned person is truly guilty; but if you’re going to kill someone, sane or insane doesn’t make a great deal of difference.)
Last. Apprendi/Blakely/Booker sentencing problem. I’m aware of the problem, but not familiar enough with the old process to explain it very well. It has to do with juries determining facts relevant to the length of a convict’s sentence.
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