Blog activity was slow today because I went down to Indy for a CLE on estates. I will say this — apparently estate practice is not a young man’s game. I’d put the average age of the attendees of that seminar at about 65.
SB 77 – Canned hunting
SB 77 regarding shooting preserves passed Second Reading with a hotly contested amendment introduced by Rep. Wolkins being adopted 47 to 46.
The Engrossed Senate Bill was a simple affair that prohibited establishing shooting preserves within one mile of a state owned game refuge or state public hunting ground — this reduces the radius from its current status at 5 miles. It also allowed the director of the department of natural resources to adopt rules prohibiting duck shooting on a shooting preserve.
Rep. Wolkins’ amendment adds provisions phasing out hunting and harvesting animals in shooting preserves by 2013 and prohibiting releasing an animal in a shooting preserve after 2011. Only persons who have obtained a shooting preserve license and proves that they allowed hunting in 2003, 2004, or 2005 will be allowed to get a license between 2006 and 2013.
Looks like Rep. Heim owes Rep. Wolkins a big “thank you” for making his legislation a lot harder to pass.
According to a story by Nikki Kelly in the Fort Wayne Journal Gazette, this is an effort by Rep. Wolkins to retaliate against DNR for deciding to shut down “high-fence deer operations.” He says it’s hypocritical for DNR to shut down canned deer hunting without going after pheasant and quail preserves.
I think Rep. Heim does an excellent job of shooting down (sorry) this line of reasoning:
Rep. Steve Heim, R-Culver, said the game preserve industry has a long history in the state, dating back to 1969.
He noted that 20 percent of the birds escape the preserves by flying away – something deer cannot do.
“Deer run into fences,†Heim said. “If a deer can have wings, it might be a fair comparison.â€
The article goes on to explain DNR’s position in the matter.
SB 71 – Drainage assessments and storm water
SB 71 concerning drainage assessments and storm water passed Second Reading with an amendment specific to Marion County that passed 48 to 45.
Provides that the
state and political subdivisions are not exempt from drainage
assessments. Provides that the state is not entitled to a refund of a
drainage assessment paid before January 1, 2006. Requires county
treasurers to send annually to the state land office a list of state
property for which drainage assessments are delinquent. Establishes the
procedures for and the conditions under which an excluded city or town
in Marion County may withdraw from the storm water special taxing
district.
SB 54 – Handguns
SB 54 having to do with handguns, use of deadly force, and one’s duty to retreat passed Second Reading in the House. Among other things, the law specifies that in circumstances where a person is justified in using deadly force, the person does not have a duty to retreat. It also adds protection against unlawful entry of an occupied motor vehicle as a justification for use of deadly force. The bill also permits issuance of a lifetime handgun license.
Sodrel’s Bill
Rep. Sodrel’s court stripping bill is not yet available through Thomas, but someone was kind enough to forward me a copy. (While I’m thinking of it, I want to once again recommend the site Plogress. It’s a site that has a script that scours Thomas for information on legislative action by the Congress.)
Rep. Sodrel’s bill strips federal courts of jurisdiction to remedy Constitutional violations committed by state governments through government speech. The most relevant portion states as follows:
No court created by Act of Congress shall have any
jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or decide any question pertaining to the interpretation or the validity, under the Constitution, of the content of speech of any member of a State legislative body or any individual invited by a State legislative body to speak before that body, when such speech occurs during the legislative session of that body.
This legislation is pretty obviously seeking to take advantage of a possible interpretation of Art. 3, Sec. 2 of the U.S. Constitution. That provision says:
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;–to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;–to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;–to controversies to which the United States shall be a party;–to controversies between two or more states;–between a state and citizens of another state;–between citizens of different states;–between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.
In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.
Lately it seems that certain members of Congress have been eager to file bills that remove one issue or another from federal court jurisdiction. I don’t know what the jurisprudence on this issue is, but I have serious doubts as to whether Congress has the power to entirely deprive the federal judiciary of jurisdiction over government violations of the U.S. Constitution. In this case, it’s a relatively minor squabble over the Establishment Clause. But, in principal, if we follow Rep. Sodrel’s logic, there is nothing preventing Congress from prohibiting the courts from hearing cases alleging violations of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibiting slavery. With no access to the courts, a person could be enslaved and there would be no way for the person to enforce the person’s right to be free from involuntary servitude under the Thirteenth Amendment. If we open Rep. Sodrel’s can of worms, Congress would have the power to repeal any provision of the Constitution by a simple majority vote of the Congress.
I think there is a more likely interpretation of the Constitutional provision that says “In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme
Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with
such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.” I think this authorizes Congress to legislate original jurisdiction for the Supreme Court on those other kinds of cases even though the Constitutional default setting is for the Supreme Court to have appellate jurisdiction. The exceptions the Congress is allowed to create are to the appellate nature of the jurisdiciton, not to the jurisdiction itself. I think this view of the provision his supported by Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist Number 81 where he says, in part:
We have seen that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would
be confined to two classes of causes, and those of a nature rarely to
occur. In all other cases of federal cognizance, the original
jurisdiction would appertain to the inferior tribunals; and the Supreme
Court would have nothing more than an appellate jurisdiction, “with
such EXCEPTIONS and under such REGULATIONS as the Congress shall make.”
Hamilton is focused on the issue of whether the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction will be appellate or original, not whether it would be deprived of jurisdiction altogether.
Aside from technical legal issues of the law, there is a deeply practical reason why court stripping bills such as Rep. Sodrel’s should never be contemplated. A nation governed by laws depends on citizens perceiving those laws as legitimate in order to function. Access to the courts and review of those laws by an independent judiciary confers legitimacy on the law, regardless of whether a citizen believes the particular law to be misguided. The citizen, therefore, obeys the law even if he or she disagrees with it because he or she regards it as legitimate. Because our laws are, by and large, perceived by the citizenry as legitimate, it takes a relatively small amount of force to enforce the law. Remove the perception of legitimacy, and it becomes much more difficult to govern your citizens.
Turning back to the issue of Christian prayer offered by the Indiana government as official business of the Indiana House of Representatives. For years, we had a workable system in the Indiana General Assembly. The House opened its sessions with prayers. The prayers were probably in technical violation of the Constitution in that they were sectarian and not ecumenical, but nobody got too worked up about it. For the most part, those leading the prayers were respectful of those who did not share their views and they focused more on the uplifting qualities of prayer and less on their devotion to a particular deity. In short, the majority was polite to the minority.
But this year, those leading the prayer were less respectful of others and, finally, we had the spectacle of a revival-style, clapping and dancing rendition of the song “Just a Little Walk with Jesus” in which the sensibilities of those who do not worship Jesus and even those who choose not to worship Jesus in that fashion were ignored. In short, the majority forgot its manners.
That escalation of the prayer led to escalation on the other side in the form of a lawsuit. Now we have further escalation in the form of legislation that would chip away at the underpinnings of the rule of law. And for what? For lack of common courtesy. We are not being well served on this issue by our legislators at either the state or the federal level.
Abdul gets a lecture
Indiana Barrister’s Abdul Hakim-Shabazz got himself a lecture from Rep. Dan Burton when Mr. Shabazz had the audacity to ask tough questions about Rep. Sodrel’s court-stripping scheme. He has a good post up on the day’s events. I noticed other blog entries at Advance Indiana and The Howey Report.
In addition to some relevant analysis of Judge Hamilton’s decision, Abdul wishes we could have an Eleventh Amendment: “Thou shall not grandstand and use my name in the process!” Moses didn’t offer any such commandment, so we have to rely on the New Testament instead:
And when ye pray, ye shall not be as the hypocrites: for they love
to stand and pray in the synagogues and in the corners of the streets,
that they may be seen of men. Verily I say unto you, They have received
their reward.But thou, when thou prayest, enter into thine inner chamber, and
having shut thy door, pray to thy Father who is in secret, and thy
Father who seeth in secret shall recompense thee.And in praying use not vain repetitions, as the Gentiles do: for they think that they shall be heard for their much speaking.
Be not therefore like unto them: for your Father knoweth what things ye have need of, before ye ask him.
Mark 6:5-8.
Washington Post covers DST
The Washington Post has an article by Peter Slevin on Indiana’s Daylight Saving Time/Time Zone struggles. I don’t have time to summarize it at the moment, so I’ll merely recommend that you check it out. I will note that it has comments for Central Time heroes Mark Catanzarite, John Gaski, and Mike Lerman. Also, there is a good map in the sidebar.
Sodrel seeks to limit minority access to justice
Hot on the heels of Rep. Bosma’s implication (and subsequent apology) that Christian prayer as official business of the House Representatives is acceptable because non-Christians are a minority of the population, U.S. Rep. Mike Sodrel seeks to bar access to the courts for minorities whose rights are violated by the likes of Bosma.
Sodrel has introduced a bill (H.R. 4776 – not yet available) that purports “To amend title 28, United States Code, with respect to the jurisdiction
of Federal courts over certain cases and controversies involving the
content of speech occurring during sessions of State legislative
bodies, and for other purposes.”
Without reading the legislation, it’s impossible to be sure, but presumably Sodrel’s legislation would prohibit judicial review and remedy where state legislatures choose to officially embrace Christianity or particular subsets thereof such as Catholicism or Mormonism because, like Rep. Bosma, they choose to ignore the Constitutional rights of those of minority faiths.
Again, the whole point of the First Amendment is to protect those in the minority from the passions and preferences of those in the majority. For Mike Sodrel to bar the minority’s access to the courts is to render those protections meaningless. Rep. Sodrel is in a tough election fight with Baron Hill. This is a pretty obvious attempt by Mike Sodrel to inflame the passions of the religious majority for political gain. This sort of religious demagoguery is exactly why the protections of the First Amendment are so important.
(And, once again, the Sodrels and the Bosmas of the world are attempt to portray this as a free speech issue. They are being wilfully ignorant on this point. Rep. Bosma’s attorney conceded that this case does not involve individual speech, only government speech. Our Constitution places limitations on the government. Limitation on government speech does not implicate the Free Expression Clause of the U.S. Constitution.)
Lazy Muncie
Just have to add my love for Lazy Muncie, a brilliant rip-off of the Saturday Night Live “Lazy Sunday” rap (and the “West Coast” response) with a refreshing Midwest sensibility — bragging about, say, Bob Evans instead of some New York cupcake shop I’ve never heard about. The coup de grace: Garfield creator Jim Davis flashing gang signs.
Law enforcement immunity for police chases
The Indy Star has a story on an issue that has been blogged by the Indiana Law Blog and Opening Arguments. The question is whether police officers engaged in pursuit of a suspect are entitled to law enforcement immunity under IC 34-13-3-3(8). That provision states that governmental entities and their employees are immune from liability for actions they take in an effort to enforce the law.
Marion County Judge David Dreyer stated that officers were not entitled to law enforcement immunity when they hit a bystander while engaged in a high speed chase trying to apprehend a suspect. I do not know his rationale. However, the article states that the case could be merged with a Lake County case that raises the same issue.
Here is where I think the Court of Appeals reviewing the Lake County case got it wrong and where I think the Supreme Court ought to go with this law enforcement immunity case. The Court of Appeals spent a lot of time laboring over an apparent conflict between the immunity statute and IC 9-21-1-8 which imposes a duty on the driver of an emergency vehicle to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons. Ultimately, the Court decides that the immunity statute cannot be reconciled with the emergency vehicle duty statute and, because of that and certain rules of statutory construction favorit the duty statute, the duty statute trumps the immunity statute.
The Court of Appeals went so far as to quote the caselaw that leads in the opposite direction but did not follow its instructions to the necessary conclusion: “[I]t is only after a determination
is made that a governmental defendant is not immune under the ITCA that a court undertakes the analysis of whether a common law duty exists under the circumstances.” Using this principal of immunity jurisprudence, you have to make the immunity determination first. Either the defendant is immune or not. Immunity exists in spite of duty. It’s not that the tortfeasor hasn’t breached a duty of care. That’s the whole point. The tortfeasor has acted negligently but the legislature has granted immunity in spite of the negligent breach of a duty.
So, first you look at ITCA (the immunity statute) and ask whether the police officer’s act constituted law enforcement. If so, the governmental entity and its employees are immune from liability. End of analysis. It’s only after you’ve established that immunity does not exist that you worry about whether a duty has been breached, regardless of whether it is a duty imposed by statute or by common law.
If any judges out there are reading this, consider whether you think the Court of Appeals statutory construction of law enforcement immunity would shake out the same way if it was judicial immunity on the line. Judges are immune from liability for decisions they make on the bench. Say the judge negligently messes up a sentencing calculation or fails to notice an inmate is on his jail list longer than his sentence called for. Certainly a statute on the books telling a judge to release an inmate when his sentence was up or to calculate a sentence in a certain way shouldn’t be construed to impair judicial immunity.
Immunity is a cruel thing. It potentially leaves someone who was wronged without a remedy against the wrongdoer. But, at least in the context of law enforcement, the benefits of having the government free to act to enforce its laws are seen to outweigh the detriment of leaving a claimant without a remedy when the government’s employees act negligently. (And, in the case of the judiciary, allowing judges to act freely is very important without every disgruntled litigant trying to conjure up a case for judicial liability.)
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