Senators Tallian and Lanane have introduced SB 111 which would protect former employees from having to repay unemployment benefits received even if their termination was determined to have been for just cause.

In Indiana, generally speaking, someone involuntarily separated from employment through no fault of their own is entitled to unemployment benefits. Someone fired for just cause (or who quits voluntarily) is not. Sometimes “just cause” can take awhile for the courts to figure out. During a period where one level of the judicial process has determined the termination was not for just cause, an employer can be required to pay unemployment benefits. If a higher body reverses and determines that the termination was for just cause, than the former employee can find themselves liable for the “overpayment” — for the amount paid to them that they shouldn’t have received. The review process goes: claims deputy -> administrative law judge -> review board -> court of appeals -> Indiana Supreme Court. (Ask me how I know.)

This bill would provide that the former employee’s liability to an employer – including an employer who “makes payments in lieu of contributions” – for those benefits would be waived if they were received during the pendency of an appeal before the ALJ or the Review Board. There are basically two ways an employer pays into the unemployment insurance system – by making “contributions” which functions sort of like paying an insurance premium or by “making payments in lieu of contributions” which functions sort of like being self-insured, only with an account maintained by the Department of Workforce Development. The employer pays into the account dollar-for-dollar the benefits received by the former employee(s). So, in that case, this bill is telling employers, “even though you were correct and had just cause to discharge the employee, we’re letting the employee keep your money.”

I understand the sentiment. If it was a close call on whether the termination was “just cause,” it will work a hardship on the former employee to have to pay back unemployment money he or she shouldn’t have received. (I guess it will also work a hardship where it wasn’t a close call and the ALJ was just incompetent and the former employee delusional about being entitled to benefits.) But the “fair” solution doesn’t seem to be to take money out of the pocket of the employer in such cases. I guess you could reason that the problem was caused by some level of government (e.g. ALJ) making the wrong decision and, therefore, make the government (e.g. taxpayers generally) pay for the mistake.

Senators Steele and Bray have introduced SB 56 which would permit the creation of legacy trusts in Indiana. Legacy trusts (pdf) appear to be a device for creating and maintaining dynastic wealth and protecting the assets from creditors of the trust beneficiaries. These trusts can last indefinitely (the Rule Against Perpetuities is suspended for such trusts) and receive significant input about management of the assets from the beneficiaries.

This is not my area of the law, so maybe someone can offer better insights, but I don’t understand the public policy that is served by having wealth controlled by the dead hand of our ancestors or by allowing individuals to enjoy the benefits of wealth while limiting the ability of creditors to obtain payment for debts that are due and owing for goods and services that have been provided.

Sen. Steele has introduced SB 10 which would direct a coroner to recuse him or herself when the coroner has a conflict of interest and to “obtain the services of the coroner of another county” to fulfill the coroner’s duties.

The bill says that “The coroner of the other county serving under this section shall be paid by the county in which the conflict of interest exists.”

A couple of thoughts:

1. I don’t think it’s really “the county in which the conflict of interest exists” that should necessarily pay. Depending on the nature of the conflict, that could be a different county than the one employing the coroner with the conflict. Maybe something more like, “the county served by the coroner recusing himself or herself shall pay the coroner who performs services under this section.”

2. How much is the serving coroner to be paid? Is this in addition to the salary that coroner already receives? Does it matter if the services performed for the other county results in the coroner performing fewer services for his or her own county?

3. It would be nice to have more direction on how the conflicted coroner goes about obtaining the services of the other coroner and whether that coroner has any obligation to step in and help.

Some of the introduced bills for the 2015 session have been released and, true to form, Sen. Steele has the earliest releases. The first one is SB 2 concerning charges for certified mailings. Typically when a document is filed with the court and the Clerk is required to mail it by certified or registered mail, there is no additional cost to litigants. It’s paid for out of court costs. Indiana is really pretty cheap in this regard, it seems. Some of my collection clients have expressed some surprise at not having to pay much in the way of additional costs when going back to court trying to collect a judgment.

SB 2 would provide that, in the case of proceedings supplemental, a litigant who wanted to have the court mail a document by registered or certified mail would have to pay the costs of that mailing. (A proceeding supplemental is part of a court case that takes place after judgment is entered – typically a proceeding where a judgment creditor is trying to locate income or assets available to satisfy the judgment.) If it passed, this would most likely increase the use of the Sheriff to serve these documents. There is a one-time fee of, I believe, $13 that covers service by Sheriff.

As a side note, it’s been my experience that most (if not all) courts require a judgment plaintiff to serve the initial proceeding supplemental document on a judgment debtor by certified mail or sheriff’s service. As a practical matter, this makes sense if a judgment creditor is going to ask the court to issue a writ of body attachment if the defendant fails to appear. However, when I researched this years ago, I came to the conclusion that the trial rules don’t actually require it. The court obtained jurisdiction over the defendant in the underlying litigation, and the plaintiff should be able to serve the defendant in future matters by ordinary mail with a certificate of service. The defendant is required to (but very often doesn’t) keep the court advised of any changes of address.

Niki Kelley, writing for the Fort Wayne Journal Gazette, has an article about this year’s installment in the perennial effort to have the General Assembly remove its ban on allowing businesses to sell alcohol to Hoosiers on Sundays. It’s not that our good friends in the State House don’t want us to get our drink on during the Sabbath — they just want us to plan ahead, drink and drive, and/or do it with craft beer straight from the brewery.

Kelley reports:

Hoosiers for Sunday Sales, a coalition of consumers and retailers, launched an effort Tuesday in support of legislation allowing alcohol sales on Sundays in drug, grocery, liquor and convenience stores.

According to HSS, this push is about consumer choice, convenience, and, yes, freedom. (Not mentioned – profits.) You don’t want to be against freedom, do you, General Assembly?

The liquor store association, which opposes the move, warns ominously of the dangers of deregulated liquor sales being sought by out of state interests. (Foreigners pushing freely available alcohol on Hoosiers?! What’s next, jazz cigarettes?)

“We tell you this today as a tale of caution because efforts to deregulate the sale of alcohol continue to be funded here by non-Hoosier interests with some local faces for appearances and window dressing. It’s not a Hoosier groundswell,” he said.

The liquor store concern is that they feel like, to compete, they would have to be open an extra day, increasing their overhead, and they would lose market share when, for example, the family picks up their beer with the weekly Sunday shopping at a big box store.

It’s easy for me to throw stones in either directions when the competing interests try to dress up what amounts to economic self-interest in the language of noble public policy. My personal preference is to have liquor sales available on Sunday. The prohibition specific to alcohol and specific to Sundays is anachronistic and arbitrary.