SB 251, which has passed the Senate, permits schools “to rent textbooks using an average fee for each student if the average is determined using the same total rental fees that would be charged under the per student method.”

Current law permits schools to rent the books at 25% of the purchase price of the book or 15% under some circumstances (I think if the book has already been paid for.) This law would allow an averaging of the 25% fees with the 15% fees – I suppose if you had a mix of paid for and unpaid for books?

Since the Indiana Supreme Court has declined to find that textbook rental fees violate the state Constitution’s prohibition on tuition, I expect textbook fees are a revenue source that cash starved schools will want to go back to more and more often.

HB 1255, concerning evidence of collateral source payments, passed the House on a vote of 57 – 40. This would seem to be a reaction to the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Stanley v. Walker this past May.

The issue, generally speaking, is how to compensate personal injury victims for their medical bills. The Indiana Trial Rules say, basically, the plaintiff can introduce their bills and that’s prima facie evidence of the reasonable value of the medical procedure. But this ignored the fact that the medical providers often took discounts, sometimes rather steep discounts, as payment in full of the debt. Collateral source payments are payments toward the victim’s injury from sources other than the defendant(s). Some collateral source payments are excluded — the biggest one of these is insurance. You don’t want the defendant to get off the hook simply because the plaintiff was prudent enough to buy insurance. And, in any case, the insurance company has a lien on any settlement the plaintiff gets; so they get paid back if the defendant ends up paying.

The sticker price on a medical bill is often as reliable an indicator of its actual price as the sticker price on a car. The Supreme Court said that defendants could counter by showing that the provider wrote off some of the medical bill. This is different from an insurance payment where money actually changed hands. Without allowing evidence of a discount, you’re just putting extra money in a plaintiff’s pocket for bills they didn’t have to pay. (And, since negotiations about general (pain and suffering) as opposed to special (medical bills) damages frequently revolve around multiples of the special damages, the windfall to the Plaintiff can be compounded.

HB 1255 would undo the Supreme Court’s decision by prohibiting evidence of “a writeoff, discount, or other deduction associated with a collateral source payment.” Actually, the statute itself is kind of self-referential. It says, “the court shall allow the admission into evidence of . . . proof of collateral source payments other than . . . a writeoff, discount, or other deduction associated with a collateral source payment.” So, you can provide evidence of a collateral source payment but not a discount associated with that payment. Strictly read, that’s ridiculous.

As I mentioned, there are certain collateral source payments, primarily insurance, that are excluded as evidence. What I think they mean is that discounts associated with excluded collateral source payments.

This runs counter to the policy expressed by IC 34-44-1-1: “The purpose of this chapter is to enable the trier of fact in a personal injury or wrongful death action to determine the actual amount of the prevailing party’s pecuniary loss; and to provide that a prevailing party not recover more than once from all applicable sources for each item of loss sustained.”

Hiding the amount of medical discounts from the jury prevents it from accurately determining the actual amount of the plaintiff’s pecuniary loss and enables the plaintiff to recover amounts never paid by the plaintiff or on the plaintiff’s behalf.

Senator Miller’s SB 177 passed the Senate on a vote of 33 – 17. It caught my attention when I saw a Facebook group joined by friends of mine of distinctly opposing political views. The Indianapolis Star has an opinion piece opposing the bill.

I’ll confess to only having a vague idea of what is going on with this one, but it looks like it gives the Metropolitan Development Commission the power to review decisions made by the Indianapolis Historic Preservation Commission. According to the Indianapolis Star:

Currently, the commission deals from strength in setting limits to demolition and disfigurement of distinctive properties. Its decisions have to be appealed to the city prosecutor and the courts, essentially on narrow legal grounds. Under Senate Bill 177, rank could be pulled. Besides halving the current four-year terms, it would make rulings appealable to the body above the Historic Preservation Commission, the Metropolitan Development Commission. Originally, even worse, it was to be the City-County Council. Either way, members would be watching over their shoulders.

The proposal to weaken the commission does not reflect its overall record, which is collaborative and results in rare rejections. Rather, it stems from two incidents, one involving windows in an Irvington house and the other a historic church in Cumberland threatened with demolition for commercial development.

It’s one of those deals where I have to kind of scratch my head and wonder why the state is getting so deeply involved in local matters.

The Senate passed SB 35 on a 34 – 16 vote regarding various state administration matters.

Among other things, it increases from $100k to $500k the value of the project on which the Department of Correction can use inmate labor. It increases from $75k to $150k the amount of a project for which the bidding process is required. It increases from $150k to $1M the amount of projects for which retainage is required. It allows the Department of Administration to use clickwrap contract approval methods.

It allows the State to sell state property through a request for proposal method in addition to a bidding or auction process. Specifies requirements for documentation of negotiations.

It “eliminates the Alzheimer’s disease and related senile dementia programs. Eliminates the Alzheimer’s and dementia special care disclosure by a health facility that provides or offers Alzheimer’s and dementia special care. Eliminates the requirement for the community and home options to institutional care for the elderly and disabled board (CHOICE board) to conduct an annual conference on the problems of the aging and the aged. Repeals the requirement that the CHOICE board meet at least six times each year. Increases the maximum monthly cost share amount for services under the infants and toddlers with disabilities program.”

And, it eliminates the requirement that a teacher be paid the same rate of pay as an IPS teacher when the board for the Deaf School and Blind School prescribes a salary schedule.

SJR 13, the latest run at Constitutionalizing marriage discrimination, passed the Indiana Senate on a vote of 38 – 10. I’m unable to find a link to the roll call vote though to see who voted for and against. I discussed my views of this amendment a couple weeks ago.

It’s a solution in search of a problem; it is – at root – mean spirited; and it’s on the wrong side of history. One day, we will view those who fight the acceptance of gays as equal citizens in the same light as we now view Strom Thurmond and Bull Connor.

HB 1131 concerning a statewide smoking ban went through second reading today – meaning House members get to offer amendments from the floor.

Rep. Charlie Brown had an amendment adopted by voice vote which strikes me as poorly drafted. I think it’s trying to say that a municipalities ordinance can’t be interpreted to affect a gambling facility unless the ordinance specifically says so. Maybe to restrict inadvertently affecting those facilities? But, here is how it reads:

A county, city, town, or other governmental unit may not under subsection (a) adopt or enforce an ordinance that affects a facility described in section 4(a)(1) through section 4(a)(4) of this chapter, unless the ordinance specifically includes a facility described in section 4(a)(1) through section 4(a)(4) of this chapter.

Those facilities are horse tracks, riverboats, and gambling facilities. The way it actually reads is to bar enforcement against anyone if the ordinance affects such a facility. I probably would have gone with something like, “An ordinance adopted under subsection (a) does not apply to a facility described in 4(a)(1) through 4(a)(4) unless the ordinance specifically states that it is intended to apply to such a facility.”

Rep. Tyler introduced an amendment that passed 52 to 42 that would allow (essentially) smoking in places with liquor licenses that don’t allow patrons or employ people who are under 18. Rep. Clere introduced and passed 54-38 an amendment that would allow smoking in a tobacco business.

1008 – Purchase of out of state service credit. “Allows a member of the 1977 police officers’ and firefighters’ pension and disability fund (1977 fund) or a participant in the prosecuting attorneys retirement fund (fund) to purchase at full actuarial cost service earned out of state in a position for which the 1977 fund or the fund would give credit if the service were earned in Indiana.”

1063 – Energy Efficient Buildings. “Requires certain government buildings to be designed and constructed or renovated to achieve or exceed the performance criteria determined under certain rating systems”

1069 – Commuter Transportation District Board Membership. “Adds three members to the board of trustees of a commuter transportation district.”

1099 – Standards for livestock & poultry care. Allows the board of animal health to adopt rules to establish standards governing the care of livestock and poultry that consider 1) the health and husbandry of the livestock and poultry; 2) Generally accepted farm management practices; 3) Generally accepted veterinary standards and practices; and 4) The economic impact the standards may have on livestock and poultry farmers, the affected livestock and poultry sector; and consumers.

1100 – Inmate possession of a cellular device. “Makes it a Class A misdemeanor for a person incarcerated in a county jail to possess a cellular telephone or other wireless or cellular communications device.”

1135 – Advanced Placement exams. “Requires state educational institutions to grant postsecondary level academic credit that counts toward meeting the student’s degree requirements to students who receive a satisfactory score (3, 4, or 5) on an advanced placement examination.”

1165 – Exempt veterans’ from benefits attachment. Provides that a veteran’s service connected disability benefit is protected from a judicial lien, process, or proceeding to collect a debt.

1178 – Returning National Guard. “Requires the adjutant general of the Indiana National Guard to require a member of the Indiana National Guard who completes a United States Department of Defense form “Post-Deployment Health Reassessment” (PDHRA) to participate in a face-to-face clinical interview with a trained health care provider concerning the Indiana National Guard member’s PDHRA. (Currently, the Department of Defense provides that a PDHRA clinical interview may be conducted in person or over the telephone.)”

1186 – Interlocal agreements concerning courts. “Allows a city or town that has not established a city or town court or an ordinance violations bureau to enter into an interlocal agreement with a city, town, or other municipal corporation that has established: (1) a city or town court; or (2) an ordinance violations bureau; to hear and dispose of ordinance violations that would otherwise come under the jurisdiction of a city or town court or an ordinance violations bureau established by the city or town.”

Sen. Kruse has introduced SB 258 which would require 3rd graders who can’t read at a 3rd grade level to be held back. According to an Associated Press article, Governor Daniels is surprised that this bill would cost anything.

The fiscal analysis (pdf) of the bill suggests that remedial reading instruction would cost something as would keeping the kid in school for an extra year. This unremarkable bit of logic was “stunning” to Gov. Daniels:

Republican Gov. Mitch Daniels says he was “stunned” that his proposal to hold back third-grade students who can’t read well came with such a large price tag that a key lawmaker said it shouldn’t pass this year.

Daniels says the proposal to end so-called social promotion shouldn’t cost one cent. He and state Superintendent Tony Bennett say schools already are getting paid to teach students how to read so the plan shouldn’t require more cash.

The Daniels and Bennett solution: Magic! I’m picturing them teaching a class with failing 3rd graders: “READ BILLY! WHAT ARE YOU? STUPID! READ, STUPID!” But maybe that’s just my rich imagination.

HB 1131, introduced by Rep. Charlie Brown, has moved out of committee in (1) public places; (2) enclosed areas of a place of employment; and (3) certain state vehicles. (I recently mentioned a similar bill, SB 95, introduced in the Senate.) The Journal & Courier has an article by Eric Weddle on the proposed ban and how it differs from the smoking bans in Lafayette and West Lafayette.

Nothing seems to bring out the rhetoric of liberty and freedom quite like the prospect of having to ingest one’s tobacco in smokeless form, unless maybe it’s having to put on a seat belt. According to one commenter at the Journal & Courier, this would bring us perilously close to the government limiting the number of children we can have.

In any case, a property owner would be free to allow smoking on his or her property unless and until that owner made the decision to invite the public on to the property or use it as a place of employment; then the regulations would kick in protecting the bodily integrity of the public or the employees invited onto the property.

Anyway, that’s a legalistic explanation of the smoking ban. For my part, I’ve come to really detest breathing smokey air and getting it my hair and on my clothes. So, my reasons for preferring a smoking ban are self-interested. My dining experiences have improved quite a bit since such bans became common. It used to be, you never quite knew how effective the separation between smoking and non-smoking sections would be before you sat down to eat. Most of this could be avoided if more smokers showed some simple courtesy. Don’t smoke if your discharge is going to go in someone else’s face. When I decide to have a few beers, I don’t pee in your water. Chili afficianados tend to make an effort not to let their flatulence rip and get indignant (in the name of liberty!) when fellow patrons disapprove. So why do so many smokers think it o.k. to make only cursory efforts to avoid imposing their smoke on strangers?

I guess this is a culture war as much as anything else. My guess is that the smoking ban will pass the House and fail in the Senate.

Rep. Delaney has introduced HB 1034 which modifies the bankruptcy exemptions permitted in Indiana and would seem to have some unintended consequences. Someone going bankrupt in Indiana is allowed to exempt, under IC 34-55-10, certain kinds of property in certain amounts: $300 in cash and deposit accounts, $15,000 in residential property, $8,000 in other kinds of tangible property. HB 1034 would allow a debtor to pile unused portions from one kind of exemption into other kinds. So, I guess the debtor could exempt $23,300 in cash if that’s all he or she had.

This would also have the effect of altering a creditor’s ability to collect a judgment against a debtor. In an attempt to collect on a judgment, typically a creditor can only get a court order on a debtor’s assets to the extent they are not exempt. So, if you go to freeze a bank account, typically you can only get an order if the balance exceeds $300. This bill raises the prospect that you’d have to show the debtor had aggregate assets in excess of $23,300.

Update The bill has passed the House 65-30, but there was an amendment that limited the amount of cash you could have on hand to $10,000. So, if a landlord has, say, a $1,000 judgment against a former tenant for back rent, and he finds the tenant with $10,000 in a bank account, the landlord couldn’t get at it to satisfy the debt.

I guess I don’t mind these exemptions so much for bankruptcy considerations – there is a limit on how frequently you can file bankruptcy – but as an ongoing shield against creditor where the debtor isn’t filing bankruptcy, I think it’s too unfair to the people the debtor has stiffed.