By a vote of 67-28, the House has passed Jud McMillin’s HB 1403 which imposes restrictions on a political subdivision’s ability to regulate rental properties. Landlord tenant relations strikes me as something that, by and large, should be under local control. It’s a matter of local quality of life, and the particulars can be quite variable from place to place. The rental situation in Brookville, Indiana is going to be a lot different from that of West Lafayette.

Most of the changes seem to grandfather in rental regimes in place before 1984.

It restricts the ability of a political subdivision to require a landlord to obtain a permit or attend a class prior to leasing a rental unit. However, a permit may be required if its free, doesn’t expire, and will cover an entire rental unit community.

It prohibits a political subdivision from inspecting and imposing a fee on a rental unit managed by a professional manager, has been inspected by one of a variety of professionals (architect, engineer, inspector for insurance companies, HUD), and the inspection indicates that electrical, plumbing, water, HVAC, bathrooms, smoke detectors, and the structure are all safe and habitable. Inspections beyond those specified items are not allowed. The subdivision could inspect beyond that if it received a specific complaint but could not impose a fee for the inspection.

A registration fee of $5 is permitted, but a rental community can only be subjected to one registration fee. It can’t, apparently, be per unit. A penalty for a nuisance or ordinance violation can be imposed but only if the landlord is given notice and an opportunity to cure the nuisance first.

Rep. Torr has introduced HB 1083 which addresses certain child labor law issues. Current child labor laws have certain exemptions for when a child is working for the child’s parents. This bill would expand those exemptions for cases where the child works for a legal entity solely owned by the child’s parents. For example, the parents set up an LLC to shield themselves from personal liability. My only problem with this has to do with the one way nature of the corporate shield and not so much with child labor in particular.

It seems that, lately, I’m seeing an effort to allow the individual owner’s rights to pierce the corporate shield while still preventing liability from piercing the shield and getting back at the owner. In this case, there is a common sense notion that parents should be able to decide what’s good for their kids. But if, say, an overworked kid negligently harmed a third party in the course of his or her employment with the LLC, would the injured party be entitled to pierce the corporate veil and get at the parents’ individual bank accounts for compensation? I doubt it. (I probably wouldn’t even note this except for a more politically charged issue where the religious beliefs of corporate owners are being allowed to pierce the corporate veil for purposes of allowing the corporation to resist the Obamacare contraception mandate.)

The bill also expands the hours a kid between the ages of 14-16 can work – from 7 p.m. under current law to 9 p.m. on a school night, 10 p.m. on a non-school night, and 11 p.m. during the summer. It also increases the maximum hours for working on a school day from 3 hours up to 4 hours.

Finally, the bill provides for civil penalties for violations of employment certificate violations, hazardous occupation violations, and age violations of the child labor law. The House Labor Committee passed the bill, and it is now ready for Second Reading.

Rep. Eberhart introduced HB 1271 which would allow table games such as roulette, craps, and poker at “racinos” — the race tracks which now have slot machines. It was assigned to the House Committee on Public Policy. However, time is running out for bills to be heard in committee. I’m not absolutely certain, but looking at the deadlines and counting backward, I think maybe this Thursday (Jan. 30) is probably the last day for committee hearings.

The twittersphere is exploding with the news that, by a vote of 52 – 43, the House has amended HJR 3 to remove the second sentence that prohibits recognition of a legal status similar to marriage for unmarried people.

This would seem to mean that the measure won’t be on the 2014 ballot. Under the Indiana Constitution, the same proposed amendment has to be passed by consecutive General Assemblies. There is a marginal argument to be made that, because the first sentence was approved by two General Assemblies, that piece can go on the ballot. But it’s tough to argue that it’s the same amendment. There is a substantial difference between the two. The impact of the second resolution is different from the impact of the first. We can’t just retroactively declare that the current version, with only the first sentence, would have passed the previous General Assembly. (Update Rep. Truitt’s amendment was the one that was offered, and its language specifically refers the amendment to the next General Assembly.)

The House still has to pass the amended version on Third Reading and then it goes over to the Senate. The Senate could amend it again to put the second sentence back in and the House could concur in those changes — then it could get on the 2014 ballot.

This is significant. Apart from the apparent trend of greater and greater acceptance of marriage equality, the demographics in a Presidential election year are quite different from those in a midterm year.

Overshadowed by HJR 3 concerning marriage equality, I had not noticed SJR 3 filed by Sen. James Smith which would rescind Indiana’s ratification of the 17th Amendment. The Seventeenth Amendment is the one that provides for direct election of United States Senators by the citizens. It used to be that state legislatures decided who would be Senator. The text of the Seventeenth is as follows:

The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.

When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.

This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.

I’m pretty sure ratification is a “no take backs” situation. Rather, the way to repeal an amendment to the United States Constitution is by means of another amendment to the United States Constitution. Article Five of the U.S. Constitution sets forth that process, and this isn’t it. The Seventeenth Amendment was adopted because of a widespread perception that most state legislatures were corrupt in the way they appointed senators. I don’t think we should return to those days.

Rep. Speedy has introduced HB 1384 which would prohibit law enforcement from downloading from a telecommunications device for a violation of the law against texting and driving. There are exceptions if the owner consents, if there is a warrant, or if the phone is otherwise searchable by law. So, as I read the bill, this is just saying that an officer can’t download information solely because of a texting and driving violation. The phone might be fair game if there are other factors involved.

The bill is being heard in the House Committee on Courts and Criminal Code tomorrow (Jan. 27, 2014).

Rep. Koch has introduced HB 1009 which is on the Courts and Criminal Code committee schedule for Monday.

Prohibits the use of unmanned aerial vehicles and tracking devices to conduct warrantless searches, with exceptions for exigent circumstances and “substantial likelihood” of a terrorist attack. It also prohibits the placement of cameras or electronic surveillance equipment on private property to conduct warrantless searches. The warrant application has to describe where it’s going to be placed and who owns the object being tracked. The warrant application also has to include material facts that show probable cause that using the tracking device will lead to admissible evidence in enforcing the law.

Provides that, except for a law enforcement officer acting under a warrant and certain other persons under certain circumstances, a person who uses a tracking device without the consent of the person who is the object of the use commits a Class A misdemeanor. One of the exceptions includes use of the tracking device to track your own property. I expect if this law is passed, we’ll see divorce cases where a significant issue is how the car being used by the cheating spouse is titled when it is tracked by the other spouse.

Because HJR 6 /3 is very much on many peoples’ minds, I thought it might be helpful to provide a citation to the constitutional basis for amending the Indiana Constitution. It’s found in Article 16, section 1 of the Indiana Constitution and states:

(a) An amendment to this Constitution may be proposed in either branch of the General Assembly. If the amendment is agreed to by a majority of the members elected to each of the two houses, the proposed amendment shall, with the yeas and nays thereon, be entered on their journals, and referred to the General Assembly to be chosen at the next general election.

(b) If, in the General Assembly so next chosen, the proposed amendment is agreed to by a majority of all the members elected to each House, then the General Assembly shall submit the amendment to the electors of the State at the next general election.

(c) If a majority of the electors voting on the amendment ratify the amendment, the amendment becomes a part of this Constitution.

The question has arisen, what if the language of HJR 3 is amended so that it keeps the first sentence but eliminates the second. In other words:

Only a marriage 9 between one (1) man and one (1) woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in Indiana. A legal status identical or substantially similar to that of marriage for unmarried individuals 12 shall not be valid or recognized.

I did a quick Westlaw search for Art. 16, sec. 1 and could not see that this question had been addressed. But, I would say that if HJR 3 is amended to omit the second sentence, then it becomes something different than the HJR 6 that was passed by the previous General Assembly. The Constitution speaks of “an amendment” and “If the amendment.” The amendment with both sentences is something substantially different than the amendment with just the first sentence. We can’t retroactively decide that the amendment would have passed the first General Assembly if only half of it were included.

I think it’s a fair assumption that if HJR 3 passes this General Assembly without the second sentence, then we have a new proposed Constitutional amendment and it would then need to pass another General Assembly in that form.

Representative Thompson has introduced HB 1123 restricting the ability of insurance companies to write policies that provide coverage for abortion services. It was passed out of committee and has gone through second reading and is now ready for a floor vote. A policy of accident and sickness insurance may not provide coverage for abortion except if the woman became pregnant through rape or incest or if an abortion is necessary to avert the woman’s death or “a substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.” So, substantial impairment of a major bodily function is apparently acceptable if, some day, it can be reversed. Abortion coverage can be offered through a rider or an endorsement.

What is the rational basis for this policy? Abortions are o.k. if you pay for them with cash or through coverage that’s tacked on to the end of a policy with a rider but they are not o.k. if they are paid for as part of basic coverage?