Sen. Crider’s SB 195 concerning ownership of wild animals has passed out of committee. Current law provides that, with certain exceptions, “all wild animals are the property of the people of Indiana.” Under current law, one exception is for those “legally owned” under a license or permit; another is for those “being held in captivity” under  a license or permit. This legislation removes the “held in captivity” as an exception.

The bill then goes on to declare that that article of the code (providing, among other things that wild animals belong to the People) does not apply to “legally owned captive bred cervidae.” Cervidae primarily refers to deer and includes elk, moose, and reindeer.

I think, but would welcome correction, that this is intended to help people who run canned hunting operations and want to get DNR out of the way.

Rep. Richard Hamm has introduced HB 1143 concerning garnishments which encourages judgment debtors to stiff their creditors by briefly leaving their employment before returning again. It provides that if a judgment creditor is garnishing a debtor’s wages with a particular employer and if the debtor leaves that employment and returns again, the judgment creditor must “obtain a new judgment against the judgment debtor” before the employer is required to resume garnishments.

First of all, aside from some arcane maneuvers that don’t apply here, once you get a judgment, there is no getting a new judgment. A cause of action is reduced to judgment. After that, the cause of action is gone and only the judgment remains. There is nothing to sue upon to get a new judgment. So, on its face, it looks like the judgment creditor can get a garnishment if the creditor gets a judgment on a different debt but can’t get a garnishment based on the old judgment. Perhaps what is intended is that the creditor has to go back to court to get a new order of garnishment. But that’s not what the bill language says (among other things, it’s a new judgment against the judgment debtor – not a new order against the garnishee defendant”)

Either way, it discourages satisfaction of debts that are due and owing as a matter of law, and it encourages gamesmanship by debtors. Do not recommend.

Rep. Mahan has introduced HB 1019 which restricts public access to law enforcement recordings. It defines “law enforcement activity” as “any instance . . . in which a law enforcement officer is enforcing the law” (specifically excluding administrative activities such as completing paperwork). “Law enforcement recording” is defined as audio or visual recordings of such activities recorded by a device provided to the officer for use in the officer’s official duties.

It specifies that, in order to meet the “reasonable particularity” requirement of the Access to Public Records Act (APRA), the request has to include the date and approximate time of the recording, the location, and the name of at least one person other than the officer who was directly involved in the law enforcement activity. It states that the recording is not an investigatory record — (investigatory records being among the class of records that may be withheld at the discretion of the responding agency).

Instead of being discretionarily withheld under the investigatory record section of the APRA, it creates a new exception whereby law enforcement recordings in general may be withheld. It creates an exception for people in the recording (and people like their attorneys or personal representatives) who have a right to inspect (but not copy) the recording twice. The public agency is required to obscure information related to confidential informants, undercover law enforcement officers, and any other information APRA mandates as exclusions from the public disclosure.

Additionally, it creates a court process by which a person requesting a record can overcome the agency’s discretion to withhold the recordings by petitioning a court for their release. Such a petition must show the court that release is in the public interest, does not create a risk of substantial harm to an individual or the general public, and will not have a prejudicial effect on ongoing court proceedings. The petitioner is not entitled to attorney’s fees for bringing such a request. If disclosure is required, the public agency would be required to obscure depictions of death or serious injury, nudity, individuals under 18 years old, victims of crimes, undercover officers, confidential informants, and personal medical information.

In general, recordings would be retained for not less than 180 days, but if certain events took place (such as a request by a person depicted in the video), the retention period would increase to two years or longer. If I’m reading the language correctly, it also — in the case of law enforcement recordings — dispenses with the need for a requestor who is depicted in the recording to go through the public access counselor before being entitled to attorney’s fees if they prevail in a challenge to nondisclosure. It also exempts law enforcement recordings from the criminal statute which prohibits placement of surveillance equipment on private property without the consent of the owner.

I’m not sure if this is the answer, but I respect what the author is trying to do. I think, in general, having cameras present in law enforcement encounters is beneficial. More often than not (but certainly not always) the recordings back up an officer’s account of an encounter. Having a recording going — even if it’s never requested or seen — probably serves a reminder to the officer to maintain his or her professionalism. But, having a vast database to maintain and sift through in service of the public records laws creates a significant disincentive to acquiring and implementing such cameras for law enforcement. It also raises significant questions about the rights of citizens who never consented to be recorded.

I was trying to think of a way to work “double secret probation” into the title but couldn’t come up with anything. Sen. Young has introduced SB 66 which defines certain provisions (basically the ones concerning religion, assembly, and bearing arms) of the Indiana Constitution as “fundamental rights” and then imposes a strict scrutiny test as to whether government action infringes upon them.

This is going to be a little long, but space — like talk — is cheap here on my little blog, so I’m going to paste the Indiana Constitution’s Bill of Rights and put in bold Sen. Young’s fundamental rights and, by contrast, we’ll be able to see which rights are not regarded as fundamental. (For example, the right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure, the right to bail, not drawing money from the treasury for the benefit of a religious institution, a debtor’s right to “wholesome laws” protect his ability to enjoy the necessary comforts of life, and a penal code based on reformation rather than vindictive justice.)

Also, Hoosiers generally could stand to look at the Indiana Bill of Rights from time to time. There is a lot of cool stuff in there:

Section 1. WE DECLARE, That all people are created equal; that they are endowed by their CREATOR with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that all power is inherent in the people; and that all free governments are, and of right ought to be, founded on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and well-being. For the advancement of these ends, the people have, at all times, an indefeasible right to alter and reform their government.

Section 2. All people shall be secured in the natural right to worship ALMIGHTY GOD, according to the dictates of their own consciences.

Section 3. No law shall, in any case whatever, control the free exercise and enjoyment of religious opinions, or interfere with the rights of conscience.

Section 4. No preference shall be given, by law, to any creed, religious society, or mode of worship; and no person shall be compelled to attend, erect, or support, any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, against his consent.

Section 5. No religious test shall be required, as a qualification for any office of trust or profit.

Section 6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury, for the benefit of any religious or theological institution.

Section 7. No person shall be rendered incompetent as a witness, in consequence of his opinions on matters of religion.

Section 8. The mode of administering an oath or affirmation, shall be such as may be most consistent with, and binding upon, the conscience of the person, to whom such oath or affirmation may be administered.

Section 9. No law shall be passed, restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print, freely, on any subject whatever: but for the abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible.

Section 10. In all prosecutions for libel, the truth of the matters alleged to be libellous, may be given in justification.

Section 11. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

Section 12. All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay.

Section 13. (a) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a public trial, by an impartial jury, in the county in which the offense shall have been committed; to be heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.
(b) Victims of crime, as defined by law, shall have the right to be treated with fairness, dignity, and respect throughout the criminal justice process; and, as defined by law, to be informed of and present during public hearings and to confer with the prosecution, to the extent that exercising these rights does not infringe upon the constitutional rights of the accused.

Section 14. No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. No person, in any criminal prosecution, shall be compelled to testify against himself.

Section 15. No person arrested, or confined in jail, shall be treated with unnecessary rigor.

Section 16. Excessive bail shall not be required. Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature
of the offense.

Section 17. Offenses, other than murder or treason, shall be bailable by sufficient sureties. Murder or treason shall not be bailable, when the proof is evident, or the presumption strong.

Section 18. The penal code shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice.

Section 19. In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts.

Section 20. In all civil cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.

Section 21. No person’s particular services shall be demanded, without just compensation. No person’s property shall be taken by law, without just compensation; nor, except in case of the State, without such compensation first assessed and tendered.

Section 22. The privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of life, shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting a reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale, for the payment of any debt or liability hereafter contracted: and there shall be no imprisonment for debt, except in case of fraud.

Section 23. The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.

Section 24. No ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed.

Section 25. No law shall be passed, the taking effect of which shall be made to depend upon any authority, except as provided in this Constitution.

Section 26. The operation of the laws shall never be suspended, except by the authority of the General Assembly.

Section 27. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, except in case of rebellion or invasion; and then, only if the public safety demand it.

Section 28. Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war against it, and in giving aid and comfort to its enemies.

Section 29. No person shall be convicted of treason, except on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or upon his confession in open court.

Section 30. No conviction shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture of estate.

Section 31. No law shall restrain any of the inhabitants of the State from assembling together in a peaceable manner, to consult for their common good; nor from instructing their representatives; nor from applying to the General Assembly for redress of grievances.

Section 32. The people shall have a right to bear arms, for the defense of themselves and the State.

Section 33. The military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil power.

Section 34. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner; nor, in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

Section 35. The General Assembly shall not grant any title of nobility, nor confer hereditary distinctions.

Section 36. Emigration from the State shall not be prohibited.

Section 37. There shall be neither slavery, nor involuntary servitude, within the State, otherwise than for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

Maybe someone could also introduce a joint resolution to amend the Constitution to put those fundamental rights in allcaps or bold or something.

Sen. Stoops has introduced SJR 10 which would permit an initiative and referendum process in Indiana. Currently there is no process in Indiana for initiating legislation or constitutional amendments independently of the General Assembly. This would amend Article 4, section 1 of the Indiana Constitution to provide that “the people,” independently of the General Assembly have the power to:

(1) Propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution of the State of Indiana.
(2) Adopt or reject their proposed statutes or amendments to the Constitution of the State of Indiana by ballot.
(3) Approve or reject by ballot any statute, or section or part of any statute, enacted by the General Assembly

A measure (defined as a statute or constitutional amendment) is to be put on the ballot for a vote if a petition with the text of the measure gets signed by voters equaling 2% of the number of voters in the previous Secretary of State race. This is referred to as an “initiative.”

A “referendum” is the power to “approve or reject” all or part of legislation adopted by the General Assembly. The referendum gets on the ballot by a petition with 2% of the number of voters as voted in the last Secretary of State race. The legislature can amend or repeal legislation affected by referendum. They can’t do that with legislation adopted by initiative.

I don’t believe it says anything about when the initiative or referendum goes on the ballot. Special election? Next general election?

The amendment then directs the General Assembly to adopt legislation which would similarly impose the initiative and referendum process on units of local government.

The problem with this sort of thing is that the electorate is not usually all that engaged and, even if you don’t think your legislator sufficiently understands the laws he or she is passing, this pales in comparison to how little your average voter will be familiar with the context of these laws. Even though the process appears very democratic and perhaps that’s even the intent — more often than not, I expect that this process would be used by interests with money who can demagogue an issue to their advantage.

Update I had intended to mention this , but then forgot until Matt (not sure he wants credit or not, so I’ll leave it at the first name!) brought up Ohio on Facebook. I am cautiously supportive of a process which I (perhaps mistakenly) believe exists in Ohio — a “veto only” sort of referendum process that allows voters to hold a referendum on passed legislation in order to repeal it. So, they can veto legislation but not propose it. I don’t think I’m conflicted on whether would support a line item veto for this sort of process or, alternatively, only an up or down vote on a bill. My first inclination would be to require an up or down vote on the entire bill that was passed rather than the ability to pick particular sections of the bill. Think, for example, if a bill had expenditures and taxes to support those expenditures, then the citizens came along and repealed only the taxes but kept the expenditures. But, that makes things awfully messy if, for example, objectionable social legislation is squirreled away in an otherwise very necessary and appropriate budget bill. So, I like this sort of veto-only referendum process much better in theory than the referendum and initiative process; but it still has some very thorny problems.

Sen. Steele has introduced SB 155 which would require people arrested for low level offenses, with certain exceptions, to be released on their own recognizance (i.e. not have to post bail to get out of jail pending trial.)

Requires a court to release a defendant whose most serious charge is a misdemeanor or a Level 6 felony on the defendant’s own recognizance unless the defendant: (1) is charged with a crime of domestic violence, a violent crime, or a sex offense; (2) has previously failed to appear before the court as ordered; (3) is a sex or violent offender; (4) has been convicted of a misdemeanor within the previous five years or of a Level 6 felony within the previous 10 years; or (5) has been convicted of murder or a Level 5 or greater felony at any time.

Seems to make sense. They are innocent until proven guilty — if they aren’t a particular danger to the community and not a flight risk, probably it doesn’t hurt to let them go while the case is pending. The fiscal note suggests that this might reduce local expense by taking some pressure off the county jails.

Sen. Head has introduced SB 15 which attempts to improve the availability of fresh and unprocessed food in locations where such food is not readily available. The bill defines “food desert” as “an area where, within a five (5) mile area, fresh or unprocessed food accounts for less than ten percent (10%) of the food inventory for the area.” The division of nutrition and physical activity within the Indiana State Department of Health is charged with developing criteria for awarding grants to assist new and existing businesses in offering fresh and unprocessed foods within a food desert. The bill would also appropriate $1 million for the grants.

This is an aside to the main point of Sen. Head’s efforts, but I will say that writing legislation to describe areas like this bill has done is surprisingly difficult. How do you define that five mile area? Lets say you pick a point, draw five square miles around it (I assume we’re talking square miles — the legislation doesn’t say that.) Is it just that point that’s a food desert? Or is any place in that square part of the desert? What if there are copious amounts of fresh food available 20 feet away from the edge of the initial square? Is that edge, nevertheless, part of the food desert? It’s one of those things that seems easy at first but gets a lot tougher as you try to write it down.

As to the substance of Sen. Head’s efforts, it seems like a laudable goal. Access to fresh food is a good thing.

With the introduction of SB 73, Sen. Leising keeps up her fight to mandate cursive for elementary schools. Generally, I think educators and not the Indiana General Assembly should tend to the details of required school curriculum. On a personal level, as I’ve noted before, I’m very open to the idea that — given that instructional time is not infinite — schools might prioritize subjects other than cursive. Cursive writing is an anachronism. I have seen people arguing the mental benefits of writing over keyboarding, but I don’t think I’ve seen much in the way of advocacy separating out benefits from cursive that one does not also get from printing.

Mainly — I’ll confess — my bad attitude comes from the fact that I always hated writing in cursive, do not believe it has improved my life in any substantial way, and I stopped doing it as soon as I was permitted.

My entry from last year:

Sen. Leising has been tilting at this particular windmill for years since the State Board of Education made cursive discretionary for schools to teach. Advocates of cursive come up with post hoc rationalizations for why they care so much. It’s for the children, of course. But the justifications are specious:

“They need to be able to sign their name.”
Fine, spend a few hours one day teaching them to sign their name.

“It affects brain development.”
You get the same development from printing.

“They need to be able to read the original Declaration of Independence.”
When they get to this point, proponents of mandatory cursive are grasping at straws.

The fact is that cursive is the slide rule of writing. Nostalgia is the motivation for hanging on to it. The world is changing, and that’s upsetting. The offered rationales are pretexts to justify the underlying nostalgia. If we just discovered cursive today, we would be in no rush to force it on our kids.

If teachers and schools decide to spend limited class time on this mode of manufacturing letters, it’s not the end of the world, but making it mandatory is not a useful or necessary use of the General Assembly’s power.

On the subject of cursive versus printing and the lack of data concerning benefits from cursive that aren’t present with printing — and Sen. Leising’s statements on the matter — I’d recommend this comment to my previous blog entry by Kate Gladstone.

IC 35-47-2 regulates the carrying of handguns and provides a procedure for obtaining a license to carry a handgun. Part of the procedure is that the Superintendent of the Indiana State Police Department makes a determination that the applicant is a “proper person” within the meaning of IC 35-47-1-7. There are a number of criteria for being a “proper person” — mostly referencing the nature of one’s prior criminal history and mental stability. One of the criteria under the current law is that the applicant must not have a record of being an “alcohol abuser” which is defined under IC 35-47-1-2 as “an individual who has had two (2) or more alcohol related offenses, any one (1) of which resulted in conviction by a court or treatment in an alcohol abuse facility within
three (3) years prior to the date of the application.”

SB 36, introduced by Sen. Tomes, would make alcohol abusers eligible as “proper persons” to obtain a handgun license. (Drug abusers would still be ineligible.) Additionally, the licensing process includes a review of the application by the law enforcement officer receiving the application. Sen. Tomes’ bill would forbid the application itself or a subsequent interview by the investigator from questioning the applicant about “any criminal convictions the applicant may have for operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol in violation of the law concerning operating a vehicle while intoxicated.”

Nothing mixes quite like handguns and alcohol.

Sen. Breaux introduced SB 86 which would require a person who applies for a license to carry a handgun to complete an eight hour handgun safety and training program. It creates an exemption for current or retired law enforcement officers and active or honorably discharged members of the armed forces. The training program and instructor must be certified by the NRA.

Five of the hours must include training in:

(A) The safe storage, use, and handling of a handgun, including safe storage, use, and handling to protect child safety.
(B) Knowledge of ammunition.
(C) Handgun firing positions.
(D) Firearms and the law, including civil liability issues and the use of deadly force. The instruction in the subject described in this clause must be provided by an attorney or a person trained in the use of deadly force.
(E) Avoiding a criminal attack and controlling a violent confrontation.
(F) All laws that apply to carrying a concealed handgun in Indiana

There must also be three hours of range training including the firing of at least 45 rounds.

Frankly, all of this training sounds useful whether you have a handgun license or not.