An Indy Star article by Michele McNeil entitled Schools face new price checks, describes new rules on school construction adopted by the Daniels administration.

The guidelines, which are effective immediately, call for districts to rein in project costs and justify school buildings with price tags above a national average. Officials from the Department of Local Government Finance, which approves school construction borrowing, also will zero in on projects that put sports before academics.

. . .

Daniels said schools are getting too big and too expensive, and they need to stress instruction, not construction. He said state officials will be flexible and will hear schools out if they can make a good argument.

Beech Grove assistant superintendent, Ross Sloat points out that under school finance laws, money saved on buildings can’t necessarily be spent on instruction.

Just anectdotally, at the school system where my wife used to teach, teachers got fairly grumpy when the school would cite finances as a reason to cut teachers and, at the same meeting, decide to go ahead and build new bleachers for the baseball stadium.

Kemplog has more.

John Barce was a Benton County attorney. Lloyd Lichti, who was apparently mad at Barce for his role in preparing the will of Lichti’s father, kidnapped Barce leading to his death. Lichti was convicted of felony murder, robbery, theft, two counts of kidnapping, and two counts of criminal confinement.

Lichti appealed the verdict. The court of appeals upheld the verdict. One of Lichti’s complaints was that two jurors were removed and replaced with alternates when the jurors told the trial court that they could not deliberate on Sunday because of their religious beliefs. The Court of Appeals held that replacing the jurors with alternates was within the trial court’s discretion and the trial court articulated sound reasons for replacing the jurors. Lichti also complains that the evidence didn’t support the verdict inasmuch as the precise nature of Barce’s death was not proven. The court of appeals wrote:

Here, the evidence is overwhelming that Lichti’s conduct contributed to John’s death in a reasonably foreseeable manner. By Lichti’s own admission, he kidnapped John, an elderly man with heart problems, bound his arms and legs with duct tape, forced him to record a ransom message to his wife of over forty years, and that at some point while John was Lichti’s captive, he “just died.” Tr. p. 975-76. Because Lichti dumped John’s body in a cornfield and left it there to decompose for six weeks, it was impossible to determine a precise cause of death. But the evidence shows that Lichti’s act of kidnapping John set in motion the series of events resulting in John’s death and that such a result was reasonably foreseeable. The State does not need to show a precise cause of death to sustain a conviction for felony murder, and here it has proffered more than sufficient evidence to sustain Lichti’s felony murder conviction. The jury was well within its province to convict Lichti on this count.

The Court of appeals goes on to dismiss Lichti’s claim that his confession was improperly admitted, dismiss Lichti’s claim that certain evidence was improperly excluded, and held that Lichti’s 65 year sentence was proper.

A word of advice — don’t expect a lot of sympathy from the legal system if you go around kidnapping lawyers; particularly a lawyer who is the father of not one, but two area prosecutors.

SEA 47 Criminal law. Sen. Wyss, Bray; Rep. Ulmer, Foley.

Makes it a D felony to knowingly or intentionally make or utter a counterfeit written instrument or possess more than one counterfeit written instrument. (Previously the D felony required proof of an intent to defraud.)

Makes it a C felony to possess a counterfeit written instrument with the intent to defraud.

Allows forfeiture of property used to commit forgery or counterfeiting.

SEA 44 Environmental Committees. Environmental Law. Sen. Gard, Hume; Rep. Wolkins, Heim.

Makes the environmental quality service council (EQSC) permanent. Repeals the compliance advisory panel and reestablishes the panel as a committee of the EQSC.

SEA 43 Health care provider credentialing. Insurance law. Sen. Guard, Breaux; Rep. Ripley, Pelath.

Requires that when an insurer is credentialing a health care provider — in other words, determining whether it will pay for its insured to use the provider — the insurer has to use a form prescribed by the department of insurance. The Department of Insurance is required to use the form used by the Council for Affordable Quality Healthcare.

The insurer is required to notify the health care provider of any deficiencies in the application within 30 days of submission and to provide regular reports on the application status until a final determination is made.

Similar requirements are made for HMOs and their credentialing process. However, the requirements do not apply to HMOs credentialing healthcare providers solely for providing care to Medicaid recipients.

SEA 32 Handgun licenses and noncitizens. Criminal law. Sen Zakas, Hume; Rep. Ulmer, Alderman.

Restricts the issuance of handgun licenses to only citizens and noncitizens allowed to carry a firearm in the U.S. under federal law. Prohibits issuance of a license to a person barred from possessing a handgun because of a court order or to a person convicted of a crime of domestic violence, unless a court has restored that person’s right to obtain a license.

SEA 30 Committees, commissions, and authorities. State and local administration. Sen. Alting; Rep. T. Brown, Ayres.

Continues the rail corridor safety committee until November 1, 2010, and requires an additional report.

Reestablishes the government efficiency commission (which expired January 1, 2005) until January 1, 2006, and directs the commission to make recommendations to the governor concerning the advisability of continuing or modifying all boards and commissions. (This is, apparently, what remains of the Governor’s initial attempt to eliminate all boards and commissions and transfer their power directly to his office.) Directs the governor to review the recommendations and submit those that will improve the efficiency and operation of state government to the legislative council for its review.

Adds members to the Lake County regional transportation authority. One from the Valpo’s mayor’s office, one from the Portage mayor’s office, and a member of the Porter County Board of Commissioners. The members appointed from Porter County may not vote on the distribution or payment of money by the authority unless Porter County pays a share of the authority’s budget.

Establishes the northwest Indiana transportation, infrastructure, and economic development interim study commission.

In Re: Contempt of Wabash Valley Hospital Thanks to Kemplog for the catch.

This case is pretty interesting. The Jasper Superior Court held two administrators of the Wabash Valley Hospital in contempt for refusing to abide by an emergency committment order of the court requiring that an individual be committed somewhere. (The order was apparently blank as to the committee’s destination, but the Jasper County Sheriff orally advised Wabash Valley that the order was intended for their facility.) The judge held contempt proceedings, and when the prosecutor made its prima facie case, the judge then apparently refused to let the hospital administrators testify as to their decision not to commit the person. (Though the prosecutor apparently argued on appeal that the hospital’s attorney did not offer its witnesses vociferously enough — a slightly ridiculous argument, imho, though I wasn’t there, so maybe I just don’t understand what the situation was.)

Declining to hear testimony from hospital officials at the contempt hearing deprived the hospital of due process. Due process requires not only notice of the basis for the alleged contempt but also an opportunity to be heard on the record to address the allegations. Harper, 809 N.E.2d at 350.
The trial court’s decision to limit the hospital’s testimony was based on its erroneous view that the hospital would not be able to provide any evidence that would excuse its non-compliance with the order. The trial court’s belief that the hospital could have no excuse for declining to admit P.H. was grounded on an improper understanding of the law governing emergency detentions, as discussed in the previous section of this opinion.

The trial court had determined, apparently, that Wabash Valley was not entitled to decline the court’s order. The Court of Appeals reviewed the statutes and determined that the supervisor of Wabash Valley could decline admission on the basis of a lack of capacity. The majority of the court determined that a court could review the supervisor’s decision to determine whether the decision was made properly. Judge Kirsch, however, had to write separately to express his reservations about trial courts second guessing the supervisors’ decisions.

In making the determination regarding the admission of a patient subject to an emergency detention order, the superintendent of a community mental health center must balance a myriad of concerns. These range from issues of patient and staff safety to economic and liability concerns to compliance with the requirements and standards of regulatory bodies and accrediting organizations. Moreover, this balancing must occur almost instantaneously under the pressure of the moment presented by the emergency detention order. In making such calls, superintendents should not face being second guessed in contempt proceedings before trial courts themselves under the pressure of a difficult emergency placement. Allowing trial courts to hold superintendents in contempt for exercising their discretion to decline admission to an emergency detention detainee allows the courts to do indirectly what they cannot do directly — make the ultimate determination regarding admission.

SEA 18 Loss of office by convicted official. State & local administration. Sen. C. Lawson, Mrvan; Rep. Foley.

Provides a definition of “felony” for the provision that disqualifies a state or local government official if the official has been found guilty of a felony. For that statute, “felony” means a conviction in any jurisdiction for which the convicted person might have been imprisoned for at least one (1) year. It does not include a conviction for which the person has been pardoned or that was reversed, set aside, or vacated.

SEA 15 Absentee ballots. Senator C. Lawson, Waterman; Rep. Richardson, Thomson.

Provides that an absentee ballot application may not be given to a voter if certain information has been filled out before the application is given to the voter, specifically a request for a particular party ballot, designation of the type of absentee ballot requested, the reason why the person says they’re entitled to vote absentee. Permits other information to be filled out before given to the voter, including the name, address, date of birth, and voter identification number of the absentee voter.

Requires an individual who assist a voter complete certain information on an absentee ballot application or who files an absentee ballot application for another individual to sign an affidavit attesting to certain information, including their identity and contact information. Requires an applicant for an absentee ballot to affirm the content of the application under the penalties for perjury. (Keep in mind, that a voter who actually shows up at the polls is not entitled to establish his or her identity by submitting an affidavit. If you go to the polls, you have to produce a state or federal identification.)

Establishes noon of the day before election day as the deadline for a confined voter or a voter caring for a confined person to submit an absentee ballot application by fax. Permits a county election board member or an absentee voter board member to file an affidavit alleging that an absentee ballot application has not been filed according to law.

Provides that a person may not engage in electioneering in the presence of an individual who possesses an absentee ballot. Provides that a voter who is an address confidentiality program participant is entitled to cast an absentee ballot.

Requires a member of the voter’s household or the voter’s attorney in fact who deliver an absentee ballot to a voter to affirm the voter’s identity and the identity of the person delivering the ballot under penalties for perjury. (No need for an ID, apparently).

Allows an authorized agent or employee of a county election board; or an employee of a bonded courier company; to handle or deliver a voted or unvoted absentee ballot. Allows a person who receives a voted absentee ballot to deliver the ballot to the county election board in person, by United States mail, or by a bonded courier company.

Requires a person who votes an absentee ballot before an absentee board in the office of the circuit court clerk or at a satellite office to provide proof of identification before being permitted to vote.

Establishes new criminal offenses relating to fraud and misrepresentation in elections.

Excludes from the definition of “electioneering” a person’s communications to: (1) the person’s spouse; (2) an incapacitated person for whom the person has been appointed guardian; and (3) a member of the person’s household. Provides that “electioneering” does not include expressing support or opposition to a candidate or a political party or expressing approval or disapproval of a public question as long if such expression is done by mail, otherwise such expression does constitute electioneering.