I caught some of the Twitter coverage of oral arguments in the Supreme Court’s review of the Indiana Recount Commission litigation on Charlie White. It occurred to me that there might be an argument to be made that the State is judicially estopped from arguing that White was legally registered at his ex-wife’s residence.
Seems to me, you have one arm of the State in the form of the Prosecutor in the criminal case arguing (pdf) (successfully) that White was lying when he claimed his ex-wife’s place as his residence. Specifically the State took the position that on or about February 23, 2010, White committed fraud by representing that his address was on Broad Leaf Lane in Fishers when he knew he was living on Overview Drive in Fishers. The State obtained a conviction against White on that basis.
On the contrary, however, another arm of the State in the form of the Recount Commission is taking the position (pdf) (h/t Indiana Law Blog) in front of the Supreme Court that during that period of 2010, White resided at the Broad Leaf address and that his registration at the Broad Leaf address was proper. (Brief of Recount Commission at p. 6, 11.)
Maybe there is an exception when the party is as big as the State of Indiana where the left hand is not accountable to the right hand. But, generally speaking, the doctrine of judicial estoppel says:
Judicial estoppel is a judicially created doctrine that seeks to prevent a litigant from asserting a position that is inconsistent with one asserted in the same or a previous proceeding. “Judicial estoppel is not intended to eliminate all inconsistencies; rather, it is designed to prevent litigants from playing ‘fast and loose’ with the courts. The primary purpose of judicial estoppel is not to protect litigants but to protect the integrity of the judiciary.” “The basic principle of judicial estoppel is that, absent a good explanation, a party should not be permitted to gain an advantage by litigating on one theory and then pursue an incompatible theory in subsequent litigation.
Morgan County Hosp. v. Upham, 884 N.E.2d 275, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
The State embraced the position that White was fraudulently claiming residence at the Broad Leaf address in March of 2011, following a grand jury investigation, when the Prosecutor filed its indictment in the Hamilton Superior Court. It embraced the contrary position that White resided at the Broad Leaf Address, following the Recount Commission hearing, on June 28, 2011 when the Commission entered its own findings of fact.
It’s not a slam dunk, by any means, but I think there is a reasonably strong argument to be made that the State of Indiana is barred from taking these inconsistent positions before different courts on where Charlie White resided in February 2010.